Constraining accommodative homunculi in evolutionary explorations of jealousy: a reply to Barrett et al. (2006).
This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban, wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy.